TY  - BOOK
AU  - Santos, Alfredo M.
TI  - The 1st Regular Division in the Battle of the Philippines
AV  - UA 853 P6  S26 1947
PY  - 1947///
CY  - Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
PB  - Command and General Staff College, School of Logistics
KW  - World War, 1939-1945
KW  - Regimental histories
KW  - Philippines
KW  - Campaigns
N1  - Reproduction; Includes bibliographical references; The Philippines. History and Geography -- Climate and Population -- Language, Education and Religion --  Agriculture, Commerce and Industry -- The Republic of the Philippines -- National Defense. The National Defense Act -- The United States Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) -- The Quezon-MacArthur Plan of Defense -- The Battle of the Philippines (8 December 1941-7 May 1942). The Attack on Pearl Harbor (8 December 1941) -- Simultaneous Enemy Action in the Philippines -- The 1st Regular Division --  Logistics and logistical problems of the Philippine campaign. Supply -- Evacuation and Hospitalization -- Transportation and Communication -- Services -- Personnel aspects of the Philippine campaign. Partial Mobilization -- Replacements -- Law and Order -- Prisoners of War -- Burials and Graves Registration -- Morale -- Civilian Employees -- Intelligence aspects of the Philippine campaign. Strategic Intelligence -- Combat and Computer Intelligence -- Conclusions. Role Played by the 1st Regular Division -- Role Played by Bataan in History -- Causes of the Defeat of the USAFFE -- Possibilities of Future War -- Recommendations. Military Preparedness (Ad Bellum Pace Parati) -- Logistical Planning and Logistical Preparation -- Unification of the Armed Forces -- Historical Responsibility of Democratic Countries -- Analysis of World War II Operations -- Discarding Obsolete Concepts and Building Anew for Future War -- Summarizing Thought
N2  - "The last global conflict has conclusively proven the controlling influence of logistics in modern warfare. 

In the preparation of this analytical study, I have two purposes in mind: (1) to present a perfect demonstration of the failure to appreciate the necessity of exhaustive logistical planning in peacetime preparation for war and, more important, of providing the means necessary to execute such plans; (2) to show the unsoundness of unbalanced planning in which the logistical side had not been as thoroughly and carefully planned as had the strategical and tactical side...

Motivated by the sincere desire not to see again the calvary of Bataan and Corregidor repeated, I have endeavored to picture the terrible plight of these gallant defenders and the tremendous handicaps under which they fought, in the hope that it would help to crystallize in the mind of the reader the vital necessity of exhaustive logistical planning and adequate stock-piling in peacetime preparation for war." - From the Introduction
ER  -